Inflation: Causes and Effects by Stanley Fischer
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Inflation: Causes and Effects
Volume Author/Editor: Robert E. Hall




Chapter Title: Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
Chapter Author: Stanley Fischer
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11458
Chapter pages in book: (p. 169 - 188)8 Adapting to Inflation in the
United States Economy
Stanley Fischer
The costs and effects of inflation depend on the extent to which the
institutional structure of the economy has adjusted to its existence. The
United States economy has in the seventies made a variety of adjustments
that make it easier for individuals to live with inflation, but which also
produce complicated side effects.
In this paper I review in detail the major institutional changes in the
economy that have made it easier to live with inflation, and briefly
describe the most important of the remaining nonadaptations. The econ-
omy is now at a stage where most individuals have some protection
against inflation, but where inflation still has major economic effects. The
economic implications of the increasing indexation of the economy are
also analyzed.
Section 8.1 sets the background by examining the historical inflation
record, showing that the inflation rate is now high by peacetime historical
standards but not especially variable. However, the variability of the
inflation rate has been increasing since the early sixties. Variability of
inflation matters because uncertainty about the inflation rate creates
economic difficulties at least as serious as those caused by high inflation
itself. Interest rates have correspondingly been both high and, particu-
larly in the case of long-term rates, variable.
Section 8.2 discusses major innovations in the capital markets in the
seventies that have made it easier to live with inflation, while section 8.3
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examines labor market adjustments. The response of government, as
well as its failure to adjust the tax laws for inflation, is examined in section
8.4. The effects on the household sector of the innovations described in
sections 8.2-8.4 are summarized in section 8.5. Section 8.6 discusses the
economic implications of the spreading and uneven indexation of the
economy described in sections 8.2-8.4.
8.1 The Current Inflation in Historical Perspective
In this section, I set the inflation of the seventies into the historical
perspectives of long-term United States price level behavior and that of
the post-Korean War period. The annual inflation rate in the United
States since 1880 is shown in figure 8.1. It is clear that the current inflation
is the most rapid in peacetime during that period; indeed, it is the most
rapid peacetime inflation in United States history.
Figure 8.1 also shows a measure of the variability of the inflation rate
from year to year.
1 The current inflation is not the most variable peace-
time inflation; inflation rates fluctuated more from year to year at the turn
of the century and in the Great Depression than they have recently.
However, the inflation rate was more variable during the seventies than
in the period since the mid-fifties.
From the viewpoint of an individual entering a nominal contract, the
payoff of which is specified in dollars, it is the price level that determines
the real value of the outcome. Uncertainty about the average inflation
rate over the period of the contract translates into uncertainty about the
price level at the time of payment on the contract. The fact that year to
year variability of the inflation rate in figure 8.1 is now relatively low by
historical standards suggests that there is more predictability about the
behavior of the price level over periods of a year or two than there was in
the past. Individuals therefore should not show any greater reluctance to
enter contracts of reasonably short duration than they did in earlier
periods. However, the increasing variability of the inflation rate in the
last decade suggests we should see either shorter contracts or devices to
offset price uncertainty—such as indexation—becoming more wide-
spread since the sixties, even for relatively short-term contracts.
There is an important distinction between the predictability of the price
level over short and long periods, first emphasized by Benjamin Klein
(1975). While there is not now great uncertainty about the price level that
will prevail a year from now, uncertainty about the price level in the
distant future is probably greater than in the past. Up to World War II it
was reasonable to believe that the price level would be more or less stable
over very long periods. Rapid inflation was a wartime phenomenon,
typically followed by deflation, as at the end of the War of 1812, the Civil
War, and World War I. In other words, it used to be reasonable to believeC/3
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that the price level would come down after it had gone up. That is no
longer a reasonable expectation, and uncertainty about the behavior of
the price level over long periods, say thirty years, is therefore probably
greater than it was in earlier periods.
Support for this view is provided by figure 8.2, which shows short-term
interest rates over the period since 1880, as well as measures of the
variability of short- and long-term interest rates. To a first approximation
changes in interest rates reflect changes in expectations about inflation. It
is clear from the figure that long-term interest rates are now substantially
more variable than in earlier periods, suggesting that changes in expecta-
tions about long-term inflation are more frequent than they used to be. It
should also be noted from figure 8.2 that short-term interest rate variabil-
ity is now high by historical standards and has been increasing since the
fifties. Recent announced changes in Federal Reserve operating proce-
dure ensure that short-term interest rate variability will continue to be
high by historical standards.
The features to emphasize from figure 8.2 are, first, the increasing
variability of long-term interest rates, interpreted as reflecting increasing
uncertainty about long-term inflation and, second, the rising level of
short rates. Greater uncertainty about the price level over long periods is
likely to lead to a reduction in the volume of very long-term contracts or
to the use of other devices to reduce the vulnerability of participants in
long-term arrangements to price level changes. The second feature, rising
market interest rates, combined with controls on the rates payable by
financial intermediaries, produces financial dislocations, particularly dis-
intermediation, that may be attributed indirectly to increasing inflation.
Thus much of the adaptation to inflation discussed in the following
sections relates to changes in the regulations under which financial inter-
mediaries operate.
8.2 Capital Market Adaptations
The decade of the seventies has seen a series of capital market innova-
tions that either were a response to high inflation and interest rates,
and/or make it easier to live with inflation. Taken together, they repre-
sent changes in the financial system on a scale comparable to the reforms
of the thirties. I examine in turn innovations in the mortgage instrument
and other nonbank financial intermediary assets and liabilities, the De-
positary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)
of 1980, changes in the structure of corporate borrowing, and a selection
of other developments.
8.2.1 The Mortgage Instrument and Related Innovations
Mortgages, life insurance, and pensions are the longest-term financial
arrangements into which most households enter. Changes in the structure174 Stanley Fischer
of these contracts should be expected to have occurred in the seventies in
light of the increasing uncertainty about the price level over long periods
described in section 8.1.
The level payment long-term mortgage that became standard for the
United States economy after the Great Depression has major disadvan-
tages for both lender and borrower as the inflation rate rises and interest
rates become more variable. From the viewpoint of the borrower, the
main disadvantage of the level payment mortgage is that inflation distorts
the time profile of the stream of repayments on the mortgage. Figure 8.3
makes the point. The horizontal line shows the real value of payments
made on the mortgage when the inflation rate is zero—in that case the
constant nominal payments are also constant real payments. Now sup-
pose the inflation rate rises and the nominal interest rate rises by the same
amount, so that the real interest rate is unchanged. The negatively sloped
line shows the real value of payments made in each period, given that the
nominal monthly payment is constant over the life of the mortgage. The
increase in the inflation rate increases the real value of the initial monthly
payments, which are approximately proportional to the nominal interest
rate. This means that the burden of monthly payments is likely to be
highest immediately after the purchase of the house, hardly the time
when most households would want to be making their maximum pay-
ments.
This particular difficulty can be overcome by the graduated payment
mortgage (GPM) , an instrument by which the nominal payments rise over
time. Such mortgages were authorized for FHA mortgages (which account
for 10% of mortgages) in some western states in 1978 and were im-
mediately successful. By the beginning of 1979, over half the FHA mort-
gage applications received in California were for GPMS. GPMS may now be
offered in all states, and the wider diffusion of the instrument should be
expected.
2
On the lender side, the level payment mortgage creates the difficulty
that lenders are locked in for long periods to instruments whose nominal
returns do not vary even as the rates they have to pay on deposits to
remain competitive fluctuate with short-term market rates. Changes in
the nature of the mortgage instrument are one way out of this problem.
Two experiments have been tried. The first is the introduction, again
primarily in California, of the variable rate mortgage (VRM), an instru-
ment on which the interest rate can be changed periodically, VRMS were
authorized in 1974, and by 1978 they accounted for over 20% of the
mortgages held in California savings and loan associations.
3 The second
innovation that permits changes in the interest rate paid on mortgages is
the rollover mortgage, commonly used in Canada. The interest rate on
this mortgage is renegotiated every five years, with the borrower being
guaranteed that refinancing will be available. Both the VRM and rollover£ CD
oil176 Stanley Fischer
mortgage tend to help the lender (given that borrowers are typically
allowed to renegotiate terms when interest rates fall) and are therefore
offered at a lower interest rate than the level payment mortgage.
There have been other innovations on both sides of mortgage lending
institutions' balance sheets that have made those institutions less vulner-
able to interest rate fluctuations. Most important has been the develop-
ment of secondary markets for mortgages. In the seventies, the financial
intermediary system acquired the ability to tap the bond markets for
funds, both through the issue of bonds backed by mortgage collateral and
through passthrough securities that sell the claims on the income streams
financial intermediaries acquire through mortgage lending. The volume
of borrowing in these markets now accounts for about a quarter of
mortgage lending.
4
On the liability side of their balance sheets, nonbank financial interme-
diaries have innovated by issuing new obligations, notably the money
market certificate, a six-month instrument with interest rate tied to the
Treasury Bill rate, and therefore precisely designed to fight disinterme-
diation. Of course, this innovation required regulatory approval, which
was forthcoming in 1978 in time to prevent major disintermediation in the
high-interest-rate period at the end of 1979 and in early 1980. By the end
of 1979 nearly a quarter of the liabilities of federally insured savings and
loan associations were money market certificates.
5 The term and interest
rates permissible on other liabilities issued by savings and loan associa-
tions have also been rising during the seventies.
In brief, there has been a virtual revolution in the nature of the asset
and liability structure of the balance sheets of the major mortgage lending
institutions.
8.2.2 DIDMCA
The Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 embodies some of the changes discussed in the previous section
and makes other changes in the financial intermediary system that will
remove most of the Depression-related features of the system except for
deposit insurance.
The most significant feature of the act is the removal of interest rate
controls, to be phased out over a six-year period. By 1986 the interest
rates paid to depositors in financial institutions will be regulated by
competition among the institutions. Rates on deposits can be expected to
adjust more rapidly and fully to changes in market interest rates—and
thus to inflation—than they have in the postwar period. For instance,
interest-bearing checking accounts will be permissible nationwide and
depositors can then expect to be compensated for rising inflation by
receiving interest on their deposits that rises along with the inflation rate.
The act also overrides state usury laws.177 Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
The act subjects all institutions accepting deposits to the same reserve
requirements, dependent only on the types and volume of deposits. The
variety of assets that different institutions can hold is being expanded; for
instance, savings and loan associations will be able to increase their
holdings of consumer installment credit to 20% of their portfolios.
6
By the mid-eighties, the financial intermediary system will be essen-
tially freed of the regulations that have made it and its depositors vulner-
able to changing interest and inflation rates in the postwar period.
8.2.3 The Structure of Corporate Debt
The major change in the structure of corporate debt in the post-World
War II period has been a move from equity to debt finance.
7 From 1946 to
1960, equity issues accounted for over 4% of total firm financing (includ-
ing internally generated funds) of nonfinancial corporate business, and
credit market debt for about 19%. From 1966 to 1978, equity accounted
for about 3% of financing, and debt for about 27.5%.
8
The above data are potentially misleading in that, as the inflation rate
rises, increased debt financing is needed each year merely to maintain
constant the real value of outstanding debt. Data on the values of out-
standing stocks of debt and equity are thus more relevant to the question
of whether there has been a shift to debt finance. Gordon and Malkiel
(1980) present data showing that the ratio of the market value of debt to
the market value of debt plus equity for a large sample of listed firms rose
from an average of 18% for the period 1957-60 to 31% for 1975-78. The
ratio reached a peak in their sample period of 1957-78 in 1974, because
the market value of equity was then so low. These data confirm the shift
to debt finance in the postwar period.
This shift to debt finance is hardly an innovation, but is nonetheless in
part a result of increasing inflation. As the nominal interest rate has risen
over the postwar period, the value of the tax deductibility of interest
payments has risen and made debt finance more attractive.
The second innovation in the structure of corporate finance has been a
shift to shorter debt. This shift is a reflection of the increasing uncertainty
over long-term inflation that was shown in section 8.1. Long-term debt
has fallen from 80% of total credit market debt in 1946-60 to 72.5% in
1979, with short-term debt rising correspondingly.
9 These data treat bank
borrowing as partly short- and partly long-term debt. However, since
bank borrowing is increasingly on a floating rate basis, part of debt that is
counted as long-term bank borrowing has interest rates that are adjusted
weekly.
1
0 This is yet another response to the increasing volatility of
interest rates.
Along similar lines, there has been a shortening of the maturity of
outstanding debt within the structure of long-term corporate debt. This
shortening for the period through 1972 is documented by Klein (1975),178 Stanley Fischer
who shows a small effect of increasing inflation uncertainty on the matu-
rity of debt issues. Since 1972, when Klein calculated the average
maturity of outstanding corporate debt at 19.1 years, the average matu-
rity has fallen by about another 1.5 years.
1
1 Thus there has been a
continuing decline in the maturity of outstanding corporate bonds, which
complements the shift from long-term to short-term debt described in the
preceding paragraph.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the effective maturity of a coupon
bond changes when the inflation rate rises. For the reasons described in
discussing the level payment mortgage, the real value of coupon pay-
ments on a standard bond falls over time if the inflation rate is positive.
Thus, even if the real interest rate on a bond stays unchanged, the time
shape of the stream of payments the corporation promises shifts toward
the present as the inflation rate rises. Effectively, the maturity of the
bond becomes shorter.
The conclusion is that the shortening of the structure of outstanding
corporate debt in response to high and uncertain inflation is more pro-
nounced than the above listed data on the division between long and
short debt and the stated maturity of the debt appear to indicate. The
introduction of the floating rate bank loan, as well as floating rate borrow-
ing by some corporations, represents another response in corporate
finance to uncertain inflation.
8.2.4 Other Changes
Other changes in the capital markets will affect the ability of the
economy to deal with inflation. First, there have been changes in regula-
tions which now require listed corporations to publish inflation-adjusted
accounts alongside their regular accounts. As is well known, profits
calculated under the two accounting schemes may differ widely. Inflation
adjustments to 1979 profits for three large corporations are shown in
table 8.1. The column Profits! shows profits as adjusted for the effects of




































Source: Company annual reports. Data are in millions of dollars.179 Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
profits are reduced, for the three companies together by 48%. Profits2
adds to Profits! the capital gains the company obtains because the real
value of its outstanding nominal obligations falls with inflation. Profits2 is
a measure of the income accruing to the equity holders of the firms; the
inflation adjustment in this case raises total revenue by 14%. The change
is obviously greatest for utility companies which use debt extensively.
Profits2 remains lower than reported profits, calculated using historical
cost data, for Exxon and GM. The publication of the new accounts should
give the investing public a firmer basis for portfolio decisions.
Second, I turn to the other major long-term contracts which house-
holds typically enter: life insurance and pensions. In both cases there
have been inflation-related changes, but no major innovations. Life and
other insurance policies now frequently contain cost-of-living adjustment
clauses that permit automatic changes in the nominal amount of coverage
(along with changes in premiums) without any need to enter a new
contract. In the case of long-term term life insurance, this simple innova-
tion does remove a major inflation distortion. For whole life policies,
however, there remains a distortion resulting from the fact that the
annuities payable do not adjust with inflation once payouts begin.
1
2
Turning to private pensions, there is effectively indexation that will
correct against any major changes in the price level to the extent that the
pension benefit is based on wages at the time of retirement; if the benefits
of existing beneficiaries are linked to those of new beneficiaries, the
indexation extends also to those currently receiving benefits. But it is not
known how many individuals fall into the categories that are effectively
indexed. Recently some private pension plans have made voluntary
adjustments to individual pensions in response to changes in the price
level (e.g. Dupont). But there has been no systematic move to indexation
of private pensions, and it is indeed difficult to see how such a change
could be made in the absence of an indexed asset for pension funds to
hold as a means of guaranteeing their ability to meet indexed liabilities.
1
3
Indexation of social security and governmental and railroad pension
benefits will be discussed in section 8.4 below.
8.3 Factor Markets
Formal indexation arrangements in the form of COLA (cost-of-living
adjustment) clauses are prominent in the labor market. The extent of the
inclusion of indexation clauses in formal labor contracts has mirrored the
behavior of the Consumer Price Index in the postwar period, as can be
seen in figure 8.4. The basic pattern is that indexation was predominant in
the late fifties, that COLA clauses began to disappear in the early part of the
sixties as the inflation rate stabilized at a low level and then tended to
reappear as the inflation rate rose in the late sixties and early seventies.181 Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
Since 1975, the proportion of workers in major union contracts (cover-
ing 5,000 or more employees) who have been protected by a cost-of-living
clause has been stable at around 60%. However, there should be no
illusion that the mass of the working force is formally covered by COLA
clauses. First, only about 10% of the labor force is covered by collective
bargaining agreements involving more than 5,000 employees, so that the
60% shown for 1979 in figure 8.3 in fact refers to a group of workers
amounting to only 6% of the total labor force.
Second, existing COLA clauses do not provide 100% compensation
against inflation. A typical indexed labor contract will include some
nominal increase in wages that is independent of the inflation rate and
then provides partial coverage against price increases. For example,
wages might be scheduled to rise by 5% plus 0.5% for every 1% increase
in the price level. In this way the firm and the workers share the risks of
unanticipated inflation.
Third, existing COLA clauses do not provide full protection against
inflation because there are inevitably lags in the application of the adjust-
ments. Most COLA adjustments take place every three months, but in
some contracts the adjustment is only annual.
The questions that naturally arise after discussion of union contracts
are: first, whether the formal indexation that exists for 60% of the
workers covered by major contracts is special, applying to 6% of the
labor force; "and second, whether the increasing indexation of labor
contracts in the past decade has had important effects on the behavior of
the economy. The answer to the first question is that indexation of labor
contracts is not widespread. Federal government employees are not
formally covered by COLA clauses, but about 25% of state and local
employees are (or were in a 1978 survey). There is little need for em-
ployees on contracts of a year or shorter to be covered by indexation
clauses since price level behavior is reasonably predictable in the short
run. And most contracts, whether formal or informal, last for a year or
less. Given the conclusion that indexation clauses are not yet widespread
in labor contracts, their existence cannot have had important effects on
the overall behavior of the economy. But it should be stressed that the
nature of the current inflation—in which short-term price developments
can be forecast quite well—does not suggest a great demand for indexa-
tion in short-term labor contracts.
There is little documentation of the extent of indexation in long-term
contracts other than those for labor, though there is much informal
evidence of considerable use of indexation. It is common in long-term
industrial contracts for prices to be escalated by an index that relates to
the cost of production or the market price of the commodity being
exchanged. Similarly, long-term rent contracts that include revenue par-
ticipation implicitly involve a form of indexing.182 Stanley Fischer
8.4 Government
The indexation of social security benefits was introduced in 1972.
Estimates of the value of the existing obligations incurred by the social
security system are currently in the range of $3 trillion ($3 x 10
12), far in
excess of the marketable national debt. Given the indexation of benefits,
it thus appears that most workers own a substantial indexed retirement
benefit.
However, social security cannot be directly compared to an indexed
obligation of the government. The indexation of social security benefits
can always be overridden by Congress, and applies only for those years in
which Congress does not make any explicit adjustments to the benefits.
But the establishment of formal indexation reduces the likelihood that
Congress will permit the value of real benefits to existing beneficiaries to
fall, and thus increases the inflation protection afforded by social secu-
rity. It is in this sense that most individuals are protected from the worst
effects of inflation.
Aside from the question of whether there is any legal obligation to
maintain the real value of social security benefits, there is an economic
question of how individuals value their social security assets. Since the
system is on a pay-as-you-go basis, the benefits receivable in the future by
existing workers will be paid for by future workers, who are the children
of the beneficiaries. To the extent that recipients of the benefits are
concerned about the welfare of their children, any increase in benefits
carries with it an implied offset in the form of the reduction of the welfare
of the then contributors to the system. Of course, precisely the same issue
exists with regard to the question of whether the national debt should be
regarded as a debt or an asset or, on balance, neither, by current eco-
nomic agents. This is still a matter of controversy.
Federal government pension benefits, including those of the military,
are formally indexed to the Consumer Price Index. Federal, including
military, employees make up about 5% of the labor force. About a third
of state and local government employees are covered by indexed pen-
sions, adding another 4% of the labor force that has such benefits. But the
indexation for state and local government employees is typically only
partial as compared to the full federal indexing. The pensions of railroad
employees are also price-indexed.
Some estimates indicate that over 50% of federal expenditures are
indexed.
1
4 However, given Congress's ability to override indexation, as it
sometimes does, any such number should be regarded as suggestive
rather than definitive. For instance, the 50% estimate above includes
federal wages for civilian and military employees, which in 1979 were
increased less than the inflation rate.
There is no formal indexation of taxes. Purely proportional taxes
would in effect be indexed, but the tax system is far from neutral to183 Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
inflation. The best-know failure of the tax system to index relates to
"bracket-creep," whereby rising prices without adjustment of tax brack-
ets increase real taxes even if real income does not rise. But the most




8.5 The Household Balance Sheet and Income Statement
Sections 8.2-8.4 have described a variety of innovations and adapta-
tions that influence the way in which inflation affects the economy. But do
these changes add up to a major shift, or do they rather represent
piecemeal adjustments to the new era of high and uncertain inflation and
fluctuating interest rates? To set the changes in perspective, we present in
this section the household sector's balance sheet at the end of 1979 and its
income statement, to show which household sector transactions have
been affected by the innovations and where the remaining nonadapta-
tions to inflation are to be found.
Table 8.2 shows the household sector balance sheet for the end of 1979.
The housing stock is the main tangible asset of the household sector.
Correspondingly, the major financial liability is mortgages. As noted
above, there have been innovations in the form of the mortgage instru-
ment. But it should be noted that these innovations have occurred mainly
































Source: Financial assets and liabilities, Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts,
Assets and Liabilities Outstanding, 1969-79, February 1980. Household sector is "House-
holds, Personal Trusts, and Nonprofit Organizations." Tangible assets: Federal Reserve
System, Balance Sheets for U.S. Economy, June 1980.
* Affected by institutional changes in the last decade.184 Stanley Fischer
in California and a few other western states, and that most home financ-
ing is still done through the level payment mortgage. The advantages of
home ownership are of course heavily affected by taxation, but there
have been no major changes in the tax rules relating to home ownership
in the postwar period, despite the potent effects of inflation in reducing
the after-tax real cost of home purchases. Consumer durables represent
the second major household asset category. There have been few innova-
tions in the financing of consumer durable purchases, but since these are
financed through relatively short-term consumer installment credit, the
need for change is less. The tax benefit of borrowing rises with the
nominal interest rate (assuming the pretax real rate is unchanged), but
there have been no tax changes here either.
The major financial assets are deposits. The changes that have oc-
curred here will substantially reduce the effect of inflation on the costs of
holding funds in the traditional financial institutions. Innovations cover-
ing the remaining 62% of financial assets have been minimal—though in
the case of equities little innovation should be expected.
Table 8.3 shows that the major source of personal income is wages and
salaries. The effects of inflation on this source of income have been




Other labor income (largely fringe benefits)
Proprietors' income
Rental income of persons
Personal interest income*
Dividends
Transfer payments* of which (as % of transfer payments)
OASDI and health insurance benefits
Govt. employee retirement benefits
Veteran benefits
Other
Less: Personal contributions for social insurance
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Personal tax and nontax payments
Personal consumption expenditures






















Source: Economic Report of the President, 1980, tables B-20 and B-21.
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changed to a small extent by the increasing indexation of labor contracts.
The innovations discussed earlier also change the relation between infla-
tion and personal interest income, and of course between inflation and
transfer payments. Thus the innovations have strongly affected the rela-
tion between inflation and at least 25% of personal income, and also have
had some impact on the relation between inflation and wage and salary
income.
Little innovation should have been expected on the disposition side of
the income statement, except in the case of taxes. As previously noted,
such innovation has not been forthcoming, and its absence is likely to




The data presented in this section confirm the impression that the most
important of the innovations discussed in sections 8.2-8.4 are those
relating to the structure of the financial intermediary system. The other
changes described are distinctly sporadic and incomplete.
8.6 Economic Implications
Despite their unevenness, the changes that have taken place in the
institutional structure of the economy in the last decade can be described
as having reduced the use of long-term nominal contracts in the economy
and as having increased the extent of indexation. Formal indexation has
increased chiefly in labor contracts, though even here it will be recalled
that the indexation is less than 100%.
What are the consequences of increasing indexation? It is easiest to
start by comparing an economy that is fully indexed with one that is not
indexed. Suppose that in the fully indexed economy all contracts involv-
ing future payment tie the nominal payments to be made to an index such
as the Consumer Price Index. Such an economy is well suited to handle
the effects of an inflation that results purely from an increase in the
quantity of money. In this case, the real economic situation can be
restored by an equiproportionate rise in all prices, which is the type of
price change that indexation will produce. An increase in the quantity of
money should be expected, in a fully indexed economy, to lead to a rapid
rise in all prices with minimal real effects on other variables.
A change in the quantity of money would have different effects in an
economy in which prices were not indexed, however. In this case prices
would probably take time to adjust, would adjust at different times and to
different extents, and therefore would have effects on real economic
activity.
A fully indexed economy affected by a shock requiring changes in
relative prices as well as the aggregate price level—such as the oil price186 Stanley Fischer
shock—might have considerable difficulty in adjusting. This would be the
case if contracts essentially attempted to fix real magnitudes, such as the
real wage, over lengthy periods. A nonindexed economy could do a
better job of adjusting to a change in its real circumstances.
It is in this latter sense that indexation is sometimes argued to be
inflationary. The notion is that any increase in a price—such as that of
oil—that is required to restore the economy to equilibrium is likely under
indexation to produce automatic increases in wages and therefore in
other prices. Such changes would be less likely to occur in a nonindexed
economy. It is not, however, generally recognized that it should be easier
to reduce the inflation rate through monetary policy in an indexed econ-
cally.
While indexation is theoretically attractive in isolating an economy
from real effects caused by a "pure" money-supply-caused inflation, such
inflations are unlikely to occur. There is no record of a pure inflation in
which the money supply started growing essentially at the whim of the
monetary authority. There is usually a real economic reason the govern-
ment has turned to inflationary policy. In these circumstances, contracts
indexed to the Consumer Price Index are likely to hamper adjustment
rather than help. Further, no indexation scheme is free of lags and so
perfect indexation is in any event unattainable.
So far we have been comparing a fully indexed economy with one that
is not indexed. But the worst of all worlds is likely to be one in which the
economy has made some adjustments to inflation by increasing indexa-
tion, but has not adjusted in other areas. Then inflation is likely to worsen
the distortions of relative prices that occur in the absence of indexation.
Some sectors would be sheltered from the inflation while others would
have to bear the adjustments that the economy as a whole had to make.
To take an important example of the possible distortions from uneven
adjustments to inflation, consider housing. As noted above, there have
been extensive changes in the methods of financing home purchase,
which are beginning to remove the difficulties caused by the interaction of
the level payment mortgage with inflation. But under inflationary condi-
tions, the tax laws strongly favor home ownership (assuming interest
rates rise about one for one with inflation, as they have). With the
financing distortion removed, the effects of inflation on the demand for
housing will now be more distortionary than they were before.
Because the tax laws in the United States have made little accommoda-
tion to inflation, inflation has serious distorting effects on investment and
financing decisions. If the tax system is not adjusted as continued inflation
brings further private sector institutional adaptation to inflation, the costs
of inflation may well increase rather than decrease, despite institutional
changes induced by the inflation.187 Adapting to Inflation in the United States Economy
Notes
1. The measure of inflation variability for each year is the standard deviation of the
inflation rate over the past decade.
2. See McFarlin and Vitek (1980).
3. See Thompson (1978) and Melton and Heidt (1979).
4. See Sivesind (1979) and Jaffee and Rosen (1980) for further details, GPMS have not
been as well received in the secondary markets as by borrowers, and their spread may
therefore be slowed, at least until further experience allows for improved evaluation of
default risk.
5. Zabrenski (1980).
6. The contents of the act are summarized in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1980,
pp. 444-53.
7. Trends in corporate financing in the post-World War II period are comprehensively
surveyed by Friedman (1980).
8. The data, based on Flow of Funds statistics, are taken from Friedman (1980, table 5).
9. Data for 1946-60 from Friedman (1980), for 1979 from Flow of Funds Accounts of the
Federal Reserve System. Long-term debt is defined as bonds, mortgages, and 40% of bank
loans. Short-term debt is remaining credit market borrowing.
10. Since the Federal Reserve's survey of terms of bank lending was first made in 1977
(see Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1977), there has been an increase in the proportion of
loans in all categories that carry floating rates. The increase was greatest for long-term
commercial and industrial loans, 66% of which had a floating rate in February 1980, as
opposed to 51% in 1977. However, the increase has been smallest for the largest category of
loans, short-term commercial and industrial, which rose from 45% to 51% with floating
rates.
11. Calculation based on data on outstanding securities contained in Salomon Brothers
Memorandum, "The Anatomy of the Secondary Market in Corporate Bonds: Year-End,
1979 Update," 2 April 1980.
12. There is a general question of why graduated payment (as opposed to indexed)
annuities are not available.
13. Equity participation mortgages may be an important real asset for funds to hold in
this regard, though real estate is a far riskier real asset than government indexed bonds
would be. The recent proposal to allow thrifts to issue equity participation mortgages could
put them in the position of having real assets in their portfolios. But the tax aspects of such
mortgages—which reduce tax deductible interest payments at the expense of reduced
capital gains for the homeowner—make it unlikely that they will achieve much market
penetration.
14. See the 1979 report by the Comptroller General to the Congress, "An Analysis of the
Effects of Indexing for Inflation on Federal Expenditures."
15. See Fischer and Modigliani (1978) for a description of some of the effects of inflation
on taxes on capital, and also Boskin and Shoven (1980). Feldstein's chapter in the present
volume (chapter 7) provides a discussion of the interactions of taxes and inflation.
16. See, again, Feldstein's chapter in this book.
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